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"... SEE ERIE.": CRITICAL STUDY OF LEGAL AUTHORITY
Kris Franklin*
I. LEGAL CITATION Is LEGAL REASONING
In law schools we usually treat the proper use of legal authority as
synonymous with bluebooking,' and everybody knows that everybody
hates bluebooking. Law students hate to learn it, lawyers hate to do it,
and law faculty hate to teach it. As far as most of us are concerned,
working on legal citations is overly technical, tedious, and ultimately
trivial. It may be a primary reason for the existence of law review edi-
tors, but conveniently enough for nearly everyone else associated with
legal education, it is usually covered in legal writing programs, often
by upper-level students, allowing others not to have to worry about it.
Those who do teach legal citation often implicitly, and sometimes
explicitly, inform first year law students that some people, for whatev-
er reason, care very much about the details of citation form and that
law students and beginning lawyers are often, fairly or not, judged on
this.2 Thus, law students need to learn citation form as a sort of test of
their foundational skills, much the way sushi chefs spend years per-
fecting the cooking and seasoning of rice before they're allowed to
touch the fish. Once they pass this hurdle, they can join the fraternity
of more experienced lawyers, all of whom loathe bluebooking as much
* Professor of Law, New York Law School. I am indebted to Seth Harris, Steve
Ellmann, Richard K. Neumann, Jr., and Ann K. Young for terrific, extremely helpful
comments of drafts of this piece, and Sarah E. Chinn, who makes all of my work poss-
ible.
1. Throughout this article I use the term "bluebooking" as a generic verb de-
scribing the act of drafting or correcting legal citations, quite simply because that is
what most of us call it. The nomenclature is so pervasive, in fact, that the editors of
the citation manual previously titled A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION officially
bowed finally to common parlance, and with the release in 1991 of the Fifteenth Edi-
tion, changed the title to THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION. A. Darby
Dickerson, An Un-Uniform System of Citation: Surviving with the New Bluebook, 26
STETSON L. REV. 53, 58 (1996).
Given the publication and growing acceptance of competing citation manuals
such as the ALWD CITATION MANUAL, pointedly subtitled "A Professional System of
Citation," using the term "bluebooking" in the generic may seem to be taking sides,
but the term is so inescapably part of the practical lexicon of American lawyers that it
would seem pointless to avoid it.
2. Hence, "the substance of an argument may be undermined by inattention to
detail when creating the document in which the argument is communicated." Timo-
thy D. Blevins, A Hallmark of Professional Writing Citation Form, 29 T. MARSHALL L.
REV. 89, 89 (2003).
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as they do, and many of whom do not really remember how to do it
well. After all, that's what junior lawyers are for.
But does citation really not matter to the intellectual work of
law? Why, then, can attorneys' improper citation be sanctionable?
What explains the endless struggles about who should decide on the
proper formats for legal citations?' And what justifies extended scho-
3. For a summary of courts' criticisms and sanctions of work not meeting profes-
sional standards due to citation errors, see Judith D. Fischer, Bareheaded and Bare-
faced Counsel: Courts React to Unprofessionalism in Lawyers' Papers, 31 SUFFOLK U.
L. REV. 1 (1997).
4. The Introduction to the current (18th) edition of The Bluebook heralds itself
as "the definitive style guide for legal citation in the United States." THE BLUEBOOK:
A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION 1 (Columbia Law Review Ass'n et al. eds. 18th ed.
2005). This rather self-aggrandizing assertion, new to this most recent edition, may,
however, have been introduced as a defensive response to fairly intense critiques of
The Bluebook and the rise of a now seriously-regarded competitor.
Compiled by a student law review editor in 1926, the earliest forerunner of
The Bluebook was intended primarily as an internal document governing footnotes in
the articles the law review published. A. Darby Dickerson, An Un-Uniform System of
Citation: Surviving with the New Bluebook, 26 STETSON L. REV. 53, 57-58 (1996)
(compiling "seventy years of bluebook history"). By the mid-twentieth century,
though, subsequent versions of the manual held themselves to offer a complete cita-
tion system and had begun to be accepted as the standard guide to citation in United
States law. Alex Glashausser, Citation and Representation, 55 VAND. L. REV. 59, 62-63
(2002).
But The Bluebook has always had its critics, particularly those who objected
to its length, its pedantry, its dual system of citation forms (one for practitioners and
one for academic work), and its seemingly unattainable goal of answering every possi-
ble citation question with specific rules and examples. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner,
Goodbye to the Bluebook, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1343 (1986). Despite the 1989 introduc-
tion of a greatly simplified citation system affectionately dubbed "The Maroonbook,"
The Bluebook's foundational status remained essentially unquestioned until the 1996
publication of its sixteenth edition. With that edition came a number of significant
changes in citation format, most notably the rules regarding the use of introductory
signals. See Dickerson, supra, at 66-70. (The changes in rules for signal use are dis-
cussed more thoroughly infra at Part III A.)
Given the intense criticism of the sixteenth edition and the ongoing questions
about the authorship and style of The Bluebook itself, The Association of Legal Writ-
ing Directors came out in 2000 with their own citation manual. DARBY DICKERSON,
ASS'N OF LEGAL WRITING DIRS., ALWD CITATION MANUAL: A PROFESSIONAL
SYSTEM OF CITATION (2000). Even though it has generally received accolades, adop-
tion of the ALWD (now in its third edition) has hardly been universal. See, e.g., M.H.
Sam Jacobson, The ALWD Citation Manual: A Clear Improvement Over the Blu-
ebook, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 139 (2001); Melissa H. Weresh, The ALWD Cita-
tion Manual: A Coup De Grace, 23 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 775 (2001). The
most recent edition of The Bluebook seems to have been revised directly to keep pace
with its competitor. See K.K. DuVivier, The Bluebook No. 18 - "Thank God for
Competition ..... 34 COLO. LAW 111,112 (2005). The question of which of the current
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larly discourse on such seeming arcana as the proper use of "cf." sig-
nals5 or the cultural and contextual meaning of the ordering of sources
by their supposed expertise in accordance with The Bluebook's Rule
1.4?6
It seems that legal citation matters very much indeed. Citation to
proper authority is not simply about form. Rather, it constitutes a cru-
cial connection between legal argument and the grounding upon
which it rests. At its base, understanding citation requires understand-
ing the ways that lawyers and judges characterize and use law. Support
for assertions made is the foundation of legal reasoning-the basis of
virtually all legal conversation in a common law system. Understand-
ing how legal authorities are most effectively deployed to build legal
arguments requires mastery of all of the most fundamental compo-
nents of legal reasoning: reading sources of law meticulously, inter-
preting them critically, and applying them strategically to craft sus-
tainable legal theories about novel facts. In short, thoughtful under-
standing of how legal authority is used is a (perhaps the) central
project for those who would seek to understand how to study, learn,
and ultimately work with legal doctrine.7
It is, therefore, a mistake to speak about legal citation as if it were
simply "bluebooking." As a profession we do a significant disservice
manuals, if either, will gain supremacy seems as yet unsettled. See, C. Edward Good,
Will The ALWD Citation Manual v. The Bluebook Be the Trial of the Century?, 37
TRIAL 76 (2001).
Despite all of this struggle and rancor, however, for all practical purposes the
answer may prove moot-the resulting citation forms under both schemes are (inten-
tionally) virtually identical. Suzanne E. Rowe, The Bluebook Blues, 64 OR. ST. B.
BULL. 31, 31 (2004) ("Citations that conform to the ALWD Manual are virtually iden-
tical to those produced under The Bluebook's rules for practitioners.").
5. See, e.g., Ira P. Robbins, Semiotics, Analogical Legal Reasoning, and the cf.
Citation: Getting our Signals Uncrossed, 48 DUKE L.J. 1043 (1999).
6. Michael Bacchus, Comment, Strung Out: Legal Citation, The Bluebook, and
the Anxiety of Authority, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 245, 267 (2002) (contending that Rule 1.4
generally placing all professionally-authored work before all student-written work
exemplifies an anxiety about what constitutes authoritativeness in law, and reifies a
differentiation of authority based less on its relevance or merits and more on the pro-
fessional status of its author).
7. As one commentator summarizes: "The importance of citations in American
jurisprudence can hardly be overstated. Stability in the law depends on the principle
of stare decisis, which in turn relies on precedent. Virtually all legal argument, there-
fore, rests on precedent. Legal writers must demonstrate that the precedent on which
they rely is sound and authoritative, and citations are the shorthand they use to show
readers the nature and source of that precedent." Vickie Rainwater, Citation Form in
Transition: The ALWD Citation Manual, 7 TEx. WESLEYAN L. REv. 21, 21 (2000)
(book review).
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to ourselves by not analyzing citation critically and by emphasizing
picayune detail over substantive analysis of the ways that lawyers use
authority. Legal citation matters because it provides a window into
larger issues of legal reasoning. There are, of course, major cases that
must be referenced if one wants to participate in a discussion on a giv-
en issue. On the whole, however, the choice of authority invoked and
the context for that authority are, to a surprising extent, at the discre-
tion of the writer. Memoranda, amicus curiae briefs, and judicial deci-
sions rest heavily on the choice of source and the weight given to vari-
ous sources by different kinds of citation. The rules of citation are, in
many ways, guides to argumentation; they take for granted that differ-
ent legal authorities bring with them different kinds of rhetorical pow-
er and that the form of citation conveys (or argues for) the strength of
an authority.8
Experienced lawyers, of course, know this implicitly. But law stu-
dents usually do not. Therefore, if we do not teach it explicitly, then
we may miss a vital way to talk with students about the core skills in
their developing repertoires. For those of us in legal education, teach-
ing citation presents a wonderful opportunity to teach more than just
the proper mechanics with which to reference authority. It is a place (a
way, really) to teach the very basis of legal reasoning. Thus, this article
seeks to treat proper use of legal authority as a primary skill in under-
standing the subtleties of legal reasoning, rather than simply a tech-
nical addendum to the process of legal writing. It asks what it might
look like if legal education were broadly suffused with an inquiry into
effective (as well as ineffective or potentially improper) use of legal
authority.
I argue first that a thoughtful understanding of legal citation
sheds light on the basic processes of law. I then ask: How might we
teach students to comprehend legal work and legal studies differently
if we focused rigorously on the idea that to understand how common
law is constructed one must master the fundamental legal skill of in-
terpreting and using authority? What might such a curriculum be, and
how, if at all, might it help? While it may not be realistic to expect any
educational institution to adopt such a curriculum wholesale, the exer-
8. "Citations are the 'shorthand' writers use to show readers that the sources
they cite are sound and authoritative." Nancy A. Wanderer, Citation Excitement: Two
Recent Manuals Burst on the Scene, 20 ME. B.J. 42, 42 (2005). Citation, accordingly,
becomes the "grammar" used to communicate the rudiments of legal argument. Id.
For a discussion of citation manuals as legal grammar texts, see Jennifer L. Cordle,
ALWD Citation Manual: A Grammar Guide to the Language of Legal Citation, 26 U.
ARK. LIT-rLE ROCK L. REv. 573, 576 (2004).
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cise of imagining how it might play out may help all of us find smaller
ways to introduce or expand upon a close analysis of the ways that
lawyers use legal authority and reference legal authority.
II. GOOD CITATION REQUIRES CRITICAL ANALYSIS
Consider the frustratingly typical (or typically frustrating) expe-
rience of a civil procedure teacher: A first-year student appears in her
office on the first day of the Spring semester, clutching his final exam,
asking the almost unanswerable question: "Why did I get a B-?" 9 The
professor opens the exam booklet and reads the following:
"Castco Inc. will bring suit in federal court. The federal court will
be hearing the matter in diversity jurisdiction, so state law will apply.
The complaint will be considered timely filed under Blackacre's rules,
so Pro Sport's motion to dismiss will be denied. See Erie."9
Of course, there may be nothing substantively wrong with the
student's conclusions, though they seem underdeveloped and thin.
Moreover, the student is not incorrect to cite Erie,'0 one of the corner-
stones of civil procedure rules governing the relationship between lo-
cal and federal jurisdictions.
But, at the same time, he is incorrect. The depth and variety of
ways one might understand and apply Erie is reduced to a careless
afterthought; there is no consideration of how (let alone why) Erie is
relevant here. It is as though the citation speaks for itself and no fur-
ther elaboration is necessary. The biggest problem in explaining to the
student why his exam merited only a mid-range score is that the pro-
fessor cannot simply say to the student that he must support his con-
clusions; he thinks he is explaining and justifying the reasoning in his
answer by including the reference to Erie. After all, the Erie doctrine
9. My experience working with law students striving to improve their work sug-
gests that this is a typical example, but it is a work of fiction, not derived from any
particular piece of student work. The example (and with it, the title of this article) was
generated by Richard K. Neumann's description of this common problem, amid a
discussion of an early outline of this project. My gratitude goes to Professor Neumann
for his usual insight and intellectual generosity.
10. Assuming, of course, that the students were permitted or advised to cite cases
by name on their exams. Many faculty prefer that students not do so on typical closed-
book, timed examinations, either to ensure that students do not waste valuable review
time seeking to memorize case names or because they fear that students will make
mistakes about cases' names. Given the centrality and degree of attention devoted to
Erie doctrine in most first-year civil procedure classes, however, it is unlikely than
many students who had prepared for a test in the subject would be unfamiliar with the
case name. Rather, the fear here might be that this was all that the student recalled.
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underlies all of the points he is making in this brief passage. What he
does not understand, however, is that one vague mention of a germin-
al case, from which sprouts reams of commentary, waves of subse-
quent cases, and weeks of this student's time at home and in the class-
room, cannot possibly be a substitute for a more careful exploration of
what Erie means in this context, how it operates, and how it and its
progeny lead to the conclusions that our hypothetical student quite
rightly reaches.
Compare that free-floating citation as substitute for analysis ref-
erence, to one a higher-scoring student might deploy:
Since Castco Inc. will bring suit in federal court under diversity ju-
risdiction, the court may follow the federal rules with respect to its
own processes. However, in order to respect the constitutional au-
thority of state courts, as well as to avoid the possibility of compet-
ing interpretations of state law, the federal court, following Erie,
will be bound to follow and apply the common law that the state
has developed on this point. Prior rulings in Blackacre would deem
the complaint timely, so the federal court will be obliged to concur.
Now this is not to say that every case employed in every exam
question requires similarly methodical elucidation. In fact, quite often
the opposite is true; most of the cases assigned in a typical torts case-
book, for example, are included not as paradigmatic leading cases but
as illustrations or examples of particular legal principles at work.11 If a
student chose to cite one of these illustrative cases in an exam, she
would use it, if at all, quite differently from the way the students above
might have used Erie-that is, she would cite it in passing, or as a fac-
tual analogy to compare or distinguish the given facts, not as basic to
her understanding of the material and to her larger argument.12
(Thoughtful students should be able to understand the differences
between "leading" cases and "illustrative" ones as they read and study
them. Indeed, learning to categorize the materials in their casebooks
in such a way might lead to a richer understanding of the material they
cover, particularly for beginning law students).
11. That is to say, the particular cases have been chosen due to their compelling
facts, well-crafted explanations of their reasoning, or simply because they are interest-
ing, but any of a number of similar decisions would just as easily have illustrated the
point.
12. Moreover, if any of these students used any of these cases in a legal memo-
randum or brief rather than in a closed-book exam, their references to all of the cases
would be expected to be far more precise and not incidentally, technically correct in
form.
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The point here is that well-supported legal analysis requires a
layered understanding of how legal authority may be used in different
ways. Simultaneously, it demands good judgment in making the best
decisions about how to introduce and employ the relevant cases on a
particular issue. Too often, however, beginning law students do not
know (or are not taught) that their job is to discern, operate within,
and push at the boundaries of interpretation. For students like our
hapless civil procedure exam taker, cases are place-holders, rather
than complicated sets of arguments, doctrines, and potential ammuni-
tion for strong legal analysis. Thus, tagging the appropriate case com-
pletes the student's task-Q.E.D., his answer must be correct. He does
not understand that he has taken only the first step of a complicated
series of interpretative and explanatory moves.
Why do beginning law students not know this? It seems both au-
tomatic and axiomatic to more experienced lawyers.13 After all, any
lawyer writing a brief recognizes that citing cases is as much an art as a
science. But perhaps that is where the problem lies. It seems self-
evident to those used to conceiving of cases and statutes as tools for
explaining and justifying ideas, rather than as ends in themselves, that
the use of legal authority requires simultaneously respecting the limi-
tations of the law and energetically pushing at the boundaries of its
potential meanings.
13. Though, it is precisely this trees/forest distinction that some argue is the di-
vider between novices and experts in legal reasoning. See, e.g., Barbara M. Anscher,
Turning Novices into Experts: Honing Skills for the Performance Test, 24 HAMLINE L.
REV. 224, 225-26 (2001) (observing, with respect to the Multistate Performance Test
for new lawyers, that experienced attorneys can sort through the tasks needed to be-
gin working on a legal problem and "instinctively devise schemas for performing these
tasks," while law students "seem to work document by document" without a full com-
prehension of how the pieces of a problem might fit together). Of course there are
reams of scholarship devoted to understanding the differences between the way that
novices and experts work in law and helping law students move toward a broader
comprehension of the material they read. For but a few examples, see RUTH ANN
MCKINNEY, READING LIKE A LAWYER: TIME-SAVING STRATEGIES FOR READING LAW
LIKE AN EXPERT (2005); Leah M. Christensen, The Psychology Behind Case Briefing:
A Powerful Cognitive Schema, 29 CAMPBELL L. REV. 5, 10-11 (2006) (discussing the
differences in the ways that law faculty and students read cases but noting the difficul-
ty in articulating and explaining those differences); Paula Lustbader, Construction
Sites, Building Types, and Bridging Gaps: A Cognitive Theory of the Learning Pro-
gression of Law Students, 33 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 315 (1997) (exploring the stages
that law students typically move through as they seek to understand the rudiments of
legal reasoning); Michael Hunter Schwartz, Teaching Law Students to be Self-
Regulated Learners, 2003 MICH. ST. DCL L. REv. 447 (examining the ways that law
students learn and proposing a curriculum for helping beginning law students better
understand and control their own goals in "learning" law).
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Law students, however, have significant trouble seeing all of these
layers of potential meanings and interpretations. They see cases
stacked up like so much cordwood, bolstering whatever doctrine they
are arguing for. This world view may not be surprising when we con-
sider that the day in/day out experience of most of the first-year curri-
culum constructs a routine that is quite unlike the actual work of la-
wyering, or the law-students' equivalent, which is analyzing hypotheti-
cal fact patterns on exams. This happens despite the committed effort
of many members of law school faculties to tell and show students that
they must be ready to do that kind of synthesis and that they are capa-
ble of doing so. Perhaps this is because students spend the bulk of
their time reading and briefing cases with an eye toward preparing to
analyze the meanings of each of those cases in class, so it should not
be surprising that they come away with the assumption that this
process is the primary objective of their courses. Thus, they may over-
emphasize the importance of individual cases they read and conse-
quently under-emphasize the synthesis of (or disjuncture between)
groups of cases they encounter, the underlying questions and tension
in various bodies of law, and the insightful application of those cases
to new facts.
But this is certainly not what legal educators intend. Law faculty
want law students, and ultimately lawyers, to look at this civil proce-
dure student's exam and easily understand why "see Erie" is, correct
or not, inadequate. We want students to understand that given the
malleability of legal authority in a common law system, reference to
controlling precedent may sometimes settle a question definitively,
but more often it does not. This is why further explanation of the way
a referenced case or statute relates to the proposition for which it is
cited is so often necessary to complete the writer's task. Simply telling
law students that they must explain and justify their reasoning is prob-
ably not enough to break through. 4 They need help understanding
what it means to thoroughly ground an argument in something as
murky and subject to interpretation as case law. And they are likely to
need a fair amount of practice to do this well.
14. This precise point has been made, countless times, by law teachers and deans,
academic support professionals, and commercial services seeking to help law students
do optimal work in law school. In fact, I am not aware of any guide for beginning law
students that fails to emphasize this point as a centerpiece of its advice. For but a few
of the more recent examples, see CHARLES R. CALLEROS, LAW SCHOOL EXAMS:
PREPARING AND WRITING TO WIN 7-12 (2007); JAMES E. MOLITERNO & FREDRIC I.
LEDERER, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW, LAW STUDY, AND THE LAWYER'S ROLE 173-
176 (2d ed. 2004); HERBERT N. RAMY, SUCCEEDING IN LAW SCHOOL 111-120 (2006).
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III. TEACHING "CRITICAL LEGAL AUTHORITIES"' 5
A legal authorities curriculum would have to grow out of the
proposition that learning about the law requires learning about how
cases are used. Experienced attorneys understand that we can play
games with citation, and that the more carefully we attend to the ways
we can frame and characterize relevant cases and statutes, the more
tools we have at our disposal for constructing persuasive legal analys-
es.
A. "Citing" Includes Framing
In order to clarify the work that citation to legal authority does,
we would necessarily need to redefine the term "citation" to make it
reach more broadly. That is, we would have to collectively agree that
even technically correct citation requires more than simply under-
standing the rule 6 (and the reason) 7 for citing F.2d without a space
and F. Supp. 3d with several, or grasping the constantly-shifting stan-
dards of referencing internet materials.8 At the very least, our defini-
tion of correct legal citation work must include inquiry not just into
form but also the actual (or at least proposed) connections between
referenced authorities and assertions for which they are introduced.
Interestingly, though this connective tissue may not be encom-
passed in the common connotation of the term "bluebooking," it is
included in the denotation. That is to say, The Bluebook itself seeks to
15. The quotation marks represent my somewhat apologetic appropriation of the
language of important scholarly movements such as critical legal studies, critical race
theory, and so forth. In doing so I am conscious of the powerful social critique such
work encompasses. I wish in no way to diminish the important struggles of which
these movements are a part by using similar phrasing to describe the work of making
visible the strands of legal reasoning implicit in the use and teaching of legal authori-
ties. Nonetheless, the phrasing does strike me as an apt description of the project of
closely examining the very building blocks of legal thinking.
16. THE BLUEBOOOK: AN UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION R. 6.1, at 72, tbl.T.1, at
193 (Columbia Law Review Ass'n et al. eds., 18th ed. 2005).
17. Adjacent capital letters and individual numbers standing alone are closed up.
When the terms within the abbreviation are longer and include lower case letters,
spaces are inserted throughout the separate components of the abbreviation.
18. Rules 12.5 and 18 have been revised repeatedly in recent editions of The Blu-
ebook in an attempt to keep up with the explosion of internet-based sources and the
use of electronic databases. For a discussion of the ways that The Bluebook's usual
five-year publication schedule forces it to "race to catch up with legal researchers...
in the area of Internet research," see Christine Hurt, The Bluebook at Eighteen: Re-
flecting and Ratifying Current Trends in Legal Scholarship, 82 IND. L.J. 49, 56-57
(2007).
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codify the notion that for a citation to be "correct" it must properly
show how the referenced authority and the reference relate. Thus, The
Bluebook treats signals (and to a lesser degree, parentheticals) as ab-
solutely basic and essential components of all citations, 9 even those in
which the correct signal is "no signal."' Signals are vital parts of blu-
ebook grammar precisely because they are mechanisms by which a
writer demonstrates the relationship between an assertion and its at-
tendant citation. Parenthetical explanations within citation sentences
are of lesser significance because they are not mandatory; however,
they can be important for legal writers both conceptually and strategi-
cally because they are a place for the writer to elaborate on or clarify
the relationship between the cited and the cite, wherever helpful or
21
necessary.
The relentless focus on learning the Bluebook-approved abbrevi-
ation for "department" ("dep't" not "dept."), 22 however, obscures for
many the paramount importance of the substance of legal citation.
Thus, signals can be treated as minor or somehow advanced parts of
citation form, appropriate for consideration only by current and for-
mer senior law review editors.
Such a profound misunderstanding of the centrality of the inter-
pretive work that signals do have led to significant furor over the pre-
cise meanings of some of the most common signals. When the six-
teenth edition of The Bluebook was released, the rules governing the
use of "see" versus "[no signal]" were substantively altered.' The
19. The Bluebook's Bluepages tip B4 itself opines, "[mjastering the use of signals
is a key step to effective citation." THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION
R. B4, at 4 (Columbia Law Review Ass'n et al. eds., 18th ed. 2005).
20. Id. at R. 1.2(a), at 46, B4.1, at 4.
21. Id. at R. 1.5, at 51, B5.1.4, at 10.
22. Id. at tbl.T.6, at 335.
23. Under the rules of the fifteenth edition, any case that was directly on point for
the proposition being argued was cited without a signal; using "see" indicated that the
case was relevant but more by analogy than by direct applicability. THE BLUEBOOK: A
UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION R. 1.2, at 22-23 (Columbia Law Review Ass'n et al.
eds., 15th ed. 1991). (Using "[no signal]" required only, among other possibilities, that
the cited authority "clearly state[ed] the proposition," while "see" was appropriate
where the cited authority "clearly support[ed]" it.) Id.
According to the sixteenth edition, however, the rules essentially stipulated
that only direct quotations could be cited with no signal-all other citations required
the use of "see" to point to the authority being called upon. THE BLUEBOOK: A
UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION R. 1.2, at 22 (Columbia Law Review Ass'n et al. eds.,
16th ed. 1996).
These changes put practicing attorneys in a difficult position. Under the new
rules they were required to pepper their briefs with "see." But for anyone (which is to
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changes led to much outcry24 and culminated in the construction of the
ALWD competitor" and rapid backpedaling by The Bluebook edi-
tors. 6
How could the editors of The Bluebook have made what, in the
final analysis, was such an enormous and potentially costly mistake?
The differences between audiences for The Bluebook, students and
professionals, may have been the source of the problem. The Blu-
ebook is published by student law review editors, whose focus in
thinking about citation is the use of authority in scholarly journals.
Academic legal writing leans on the side of caution in citing cases, be-
cause most journal articles are proposing new ways of understanding
law and theorizing about the possible meanings of judicial decisions.
In an academic context, it may make sense to assign unambiguous ci-
tation only to direct quotation and more nuanced invocations to eve-
rything else.
But for practicing attorneys, all legal authorities are potential
tools for argumentation. In deciding whether and how to deploy cases,
statutes, and other forms of legal authority, advocates must resolve
two interrelated questions in rapid sequence:
say, for any judges) familiar with the standard practice of referencing legal authority
under the previous fifteen editions, an argument supported only by citations modified
with "see" could seem noncommittal and the authorities unconvincing. While this
change might not affect student editors of law journals, for whom the change in tone
suited the meticulous and cautious nature of scholarship, it proved to be confusing
and contentious in practice, where confidence persuades.
24. Most influentially, Dickerson, supra note 4, at 66-70. The outcry reached an
apex in a resolution by the House of Representatives of the Association of American
Law Schools condemning The Bluebook editors' changes and urging law faculty and
legal periodicals to continue to use the signal rules in the fifteenth edition. Pamela
Lysaght & Grace Tonner, Bye-Bye Bluebook, 79 MICH. B.J. 1058, 1058 (2000).
25. Julie Cheslik, The Battle Over Citation Form Brings Notice to LRW Faculty:
Will Power Follow?, 73 UMKC L. REv. 237, 240-44 (2005) (tying outcry over the
sixteenth edition's signals rules directly to the formation of the Association of Legal
Writing Directors and its decision to craft its own citation manual).
26. Though new editions of The Bluebook are ordinarily released on a five-year
schedule, the seventeenth edition was published after a four-year interval (published
in 2000, though expected in 2001). C. Edward Good, Will The Bluebook Sing the
Blues? 37 TRIAL 78, 78 (2001) (noting the early publication of the seventeenth edition
and speculating that it was due to expected competition with the newly-published
ALWD Citation Manual). The seventeenth edition of The Bluebook essentially reins-
tated the fifteenth edition's signal rules, with some slight modification in wording and
emphasis. THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION (Columbia Law Review
Ass'n et al. eds. 17th ed. 2000) (acknowledging that the "15th Edition's version of the
rule [1.2 on introductory signals] has been reinstated.").
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a. Can I frame or characterize the authority in question in a partic-
ular (strategically advantageous) manner within the bounds of the
law?
27
b. Should I push my interpretation and use of this authority as
far as I might, or will doing so strain my credibility more than it will
strengthen my position?
Of course these questions are patently interconnected, and their
answers inevitably overlap. And it would be the rare attorney who
would articulate her choices about how to support her discussions of
legal text in precisely this way because, for most of us, the questions
intuitively converge. But disarticulating these somewhat different in-
quiries helps us begin to untangle the complicated but often hidden
calculus that lawyers and judges make as they use legal authority. The
first question deals with the possibility of framing or characterizing an
authority in a particular, strategically advantageous way; that is to say,
would this characterization be proper (that is, true to the argument
made in the case cited)? The second is more subtle and requires an
understanding of the context in which the authority is being intro-
duced, not simply an understanding of its self-contained text. To ask
"should I?" requires an advocate to think about how serviceable an
authority really is. While an authority might be appropriate to the is-
sue at hand, it does not automatically follow that the precedent is per-
suasive or that it does not strain credibility.
Once law students recognize that citing cases and statutes can be
part of an exciting array of strategic considerations and not solely a
dry exercise in tedious obligation, they can also understand the stakes
involved in citing them appropriately and correctly. In going about
their daily business of reading and understanding cases and statutes,
students who are trained to look critically at the use of legal authority
would have richer opportunities to practice and absorb some of the
fundamentals of legal advocacy: close reading, precise writing, the cen-
trality of rules, and meaningful assessment of the risks lawyers take in
challenging the limits of the law.
27. Taking into account, of course, both the requirements of zealous advocacy
and the ethical obligation to be truthful in referencing legal authority.
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B. Games Lawyers Play with Framing
For a clearer understanding of the ways that legal authority inter-
sects legal reasoning generally, it is helpful to consider an example.
Suppose that a lawyer were confronted with the following scenario:
Mary Elizabeth Walker is a twenty-seven year old Texas resident
with a troubled past. She recently experienced a religious conver-
sion. Seeking to "change her life with help from above," she
enrolled in a four-week retreat for women held by a local convent.
At first, Mary Elizabeth found her time with the Sisters of Mercy
quite therapeutic. Just as the brochure promised, the program's
structure was quite demanding and afforded a wealth of opportuni-
ties for quiet reflection. The minimal comforts of her room, ex-
tended periods of silent meditation, and early morning chores on
the convent grounds provided the discipline and structure Mary
Elizabeth had been looking for.
After the first week, however, Sister Helen, who was in charge of
the retreat, told the group that it was "time to intensify" their spiri-
tual work. She explained that each of the women in the group
would, in turn, "encounter the Holy Spirit." Choosing Mary Eliza-
beth to go first, Sister Helen led her to a small room in the con-
vent's cellar. She instructed Mary Elizabeth to remain inside and
"search her soul," while the remaining participants prayed outside.
The room Mary Elizabeth found herself in was small and devoid of
furnishings. Having always suffered from claustrophobia, Mary
Elizabeth began to panic. She shouted to Sister Helen that she was
frightened, but the nun replied that the encounter was a necessary
part of Mary Elizabeth's path to healing, and urged her to contin-
ue. Mary Elizabeth sat for over an hour trying to control her
breathing. Eventually, she exhausted herself and fell asleep. When
she awoke, the rest of the group and Sister Helen were crowded
around her, congratulating her for successfully "fighting her de-
mons."
Within days, Mary Elizabeth began having nightmares about her
time in the "encounter room." She eventually developed difficulty
sleeping, withdrew from other group members, and cried during
prayers. She met with Sister Helen, and they decided together that
she should not continue in the program. When Mary Elizabeth re-
turned home her condition deteriorated further, and a counselor
28. Or a law student taking an exam was presented this senario. (Note that an
exam is intended essentially to be the practice of relevant law, writ small.)
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diagnosed her with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. After consult-
ing an attorney, Mary Elizabeth decided to sue the convent and
Sister Helen for false imprisonment.
Let us assume that the lawyer working on this issue has come
across several false imprisonment cases decided in Texas.29 The first,
H.E. Butt Grocery Co. v. Saldivar,° represents a fairly classic false im-
prisonment scenario: someone was wrongly accused of shoplifting and
held for a short time by store security guards. While out shopping in
Brownsville, Texas, with her mother and two aunts, Diana Saldivar
was apprehended by a security guard at H.E. Butt Grocery, who ac-
cused her of stealing the sunglasses clipped to her blouse. After the
guard escorted Saldivar back into the shop, her relatives challenged
him and demanded to see the manager. The manager arrived and es-
tablished that the sunglasses were not a brand the store stocked. He
apologized, then Saldivar and her family left.31 Shortly afterwards, she
sued H.E. Butt for false imprisonment. A jury found in her favor,
awarding her $10,000 for actual damages,32 and the Texas Court of
Appeals affirmed the award.
The second case, Fojtik v. Charter Medical Corporation,33 presents
a more unusual scenario in the context of this intentional tort. Friends
and family members had staged an intervention with Fojtik over his
abuse of alcohol and told him that if he did not enter Charter Hospital
for treatment they would have him forcibly committed, using hand-
cuffs if necessary. Fojtik agreed and was admitted to the facility."
Though uncooperative with the hospital's substance abuse program,
Fojtik always voluntarily returned to the hospital on time after being
granted passes to go out for a few hours at a time.35 According to the
hospital, Fojtik was free to leave at any time, but he charged false im-
prisonment, claiming that the threat of being involuntarily committed
was enough to intimidate him and keep him in the program.36 Here,
the lower court ruling, affirmed by Texas Court of Appeals, dismissed
the case against defendant Charter Medical.
29. Or the student who has been assigned these cases in a Torts class.
30. 752 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. App. 1988).
31. Id. at 702.
32. Id.
33. 985 S.W.2d 625 (Tex. App. 1999).
34. Id. at 628.
35. Id. at 629.
36. Id. at 630.
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The controlling issue in both of these decisions appears to be one
of consent on the part of the plaintiff. In order to make out a prima
facie case of false imprisonment, the plaintiffs must show the essential
elements: 1) willful detention; 2) without consent; and 3) without au-
thority of law.37 The other issues having been resolved without contest,
the appellate courts focused on the meaning of the term "without con-
sent." In Saldivar, the court concluded that although the jury had de-
cided that the plaintiff "voluntarily complied with a request to re-
main"38 with the security guard to establish her innocence, in fact, giv-
en her vulnerability as "a nineteen year old woman" compared to the
guard who was "male, uniformed, and armed," her decision to come
back into the store with him was not voluntary. 9 Indeed, Saldivar her-
self testified that she "didn't feel like [she] could leave."4
Fojtik, by contrast, "was a forty-five-year-old man who had run
several businesses .... [hie was not a young, inexperienced woman"'"
and could be expected to understand that he could leave at any time.
The opinion describes at some length prior cases in which plaintiffs
had successfully argued a lack of consent to their detention despite
never having physically tried to leave.42 In portraying the facts of each
case, the FoJtik court's descriptions take pains to emphasize that most
of the plaintiffs were women, the only male one being an employee of
the store from which he was accused of stealing. 3 Given the narratives
offered by the court, it seems quite reasonable to conclude that in
these cases all of the plaintiffs felt tortiously intimidated and coerced.
This stands in contrast to Fojtik's circumstances, because "none of the
factors that are considered in evaluating whether threats are sufficient
to overcome the plaintiff's free will, i.e., the relative size, age, expe-
rience, sex, and physical demeanor of the participants," weighed in
Fojtik's favor.' Accordingly, the court found "nothing in this case to
suggest that Fojtik was a person whose weakness or susceptibility to
intimidation might excuse his failure to insist on leaving when he felt
he was falsely imprisoned.,
45
37. Grocery Co. v. Salidvar, 752 S.W.2d 701, 702 (Tex. App. 1988).
38. Id. at 703.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Fojtik, 985 S.W.2d at 631.
42. Id. at 630-31.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 631.
45. Id.
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Moreover, despite the threat of involuntary commitment, Fojtik
was given several opportunities to leave the hospital on passes and
chose to return each time. Among the false imprisonment cases de-
tailed by the Fojtik court in its list was another theft case in which a
plaintiff was found not to have been falsely imprisoned.' The plaintiff
in that case, a female employee, was asked to wait or continue work-
ing while an investigation was conducted, and in the interim she left
twice and returned to the office in which she was allegedly detained.47
The court in Fojtik uses this case to support its conclusion that allow-
ing the plaintiff to leave the hospital on temporary passes (although
implying that he was not free to go at other times) was not false impri-
sonment. After all, each time Fojtik left the hospital on a pass, he re-
turned.48
The question facing Walker's lawyer (actual or hypothetical) is
which case her situation is more like: Diana Saldivar's or Felix Foj-
tik's. Realistically, the question is how her attorney can best argue
that her situation resembles Saldivar's and simultaneously distance her
from Fojtik. Simply dropping a reference to Saldivar will not be suffi-
cient:
Mary Elizabeth Walker will likely succeed in her false imprison-
ment claim against Sister Helen and the Sisters of Mercy Convent..
. . She was traumatized by her experience in the convent's "en-
counter room," and never effectively consented to enter or remain
there. See H.E. Butt Grocery Co. v. Saldivar, 752 S.W.2d 701 (Tex.
App. 1988).
This passage can be seen as the lawyer's version of "see Erie."
Both Saldivar and Walker's case involve women in vulnerable posi-
tions submitting without audible complaint to authority figures who
urge them to enter and remain in places they were reluctant to be.
Both involve circumstances in which an empathetic observer might
identify with the plaintiffs' sensation of threat, and many might agree
to remain despite feeling coerced. But the simplistic correlation of the
two cases entirely skirts the issues that complicate Walker's position.
Walker is an adult in her late twenties; she is not being detained by a
man with a uniform and a gun; she voluntarily began the convent's
retreat and freely entered the "encounter room." Although it is clear
that Sister Helen and the others on the retreat strongly urged her to
46. Randall's Food Markets, Inc. v. Johnson, 891 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. 1995).
47. Id. at 643.
48. Fojtik, 985 S.W.2d at 631-32 (citing Randall's Food Market, 891 S.W.2d at
645).
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continue the process, there is no clear indication that Walker would
have been prevented from leaving if she had tried.
Such an analysis inevitably raises the comparison with Fojtik,
whose case arguably turns on the fact that despite his complaints
about Charter House, he "never insisted that he be permitted to
leave."49 In fact, there are some striking similarities between the two
cases: both involve challenging programs in which the participants
themselves enrolled in order to make changes in their lives, and both
participants seemed to want to leave their programs but were dis-
suaded from doing so. Even though there was significant pressure on
both Walker and Fojtik from both peer participants and program
leaders to remain in their programs, it could be argued that overcom-
ing reluctance and resistance are integral to both experiences, and
therefore, do not constitute evidence of a tort. Somehow, Walker's
attorney will have to grapple with Fojtik.
It would be tempting for Walker's advocate to try to acknowledge
the potential analogy to negative authority, but to treat it dismissively,
referencing it only in passing."
Mary Elizabeth Walker will likely succeed in her false imprison-
ment claim against Sister Helen and the Sisters of Mercy Convent..
. .She was traumatized by her experience in the convent's "en-
counter room," and never effectively consented to enter or remain
there. See H.E. Butt v. Saldivar, 752 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. App. 1988)
(finding lack of consent where a young woman felt she had no
choice but to do as an authority figure asked, so she did not openly
object); cf. Fojtik v. Charter Medical Corp., 985 S.W.2d 625 (Tex.
App. 1999) (denying a claim of no consent for a middle-aged pro-
fessional man who complained about his in-patient substance abuse
program but left and returned several times).
From Walker's perspective, this version of the law is quite helpful.
There appears to be solid precedent on her side, and counter-
arguments are made to seem tangential and inapt. To most lawyers the
passage might seem to satisfy question one above.' It appears to suffi-
49. FoJtik, 985 S.W.2d at 631.
50. Parenthetical explanations within citations may be particularly well suited for
such purposes. They can create the appearance of meticulous precision in citation,
while actually allowing the writer great latitude to characterize authority favorably
without inviting the scrutiny that similar textual claims might warrant.
51. Most states' rules of professional conduct adopt standards similar or identical
to those in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct's Rule 3.1 regarding "Merito-
rious Claims and Contentions": A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or
assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so
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ciently and truthfully connect the precedent to the propositions that it
can be used, and to the extent that it comes too close to the bounda-
ries of fairness, tweaking the parentheticals to make them less aggres-
sive would likely resolve many objections.
But this is not necessarily enough. Chances are such a characteri-
zation of the law would still strike most careful lawyers as playing ra-
ther too fast and loose. Resolving problems such that the references to
Saldivar and Fojtik have minimally sufficient truthfulness (or at least,
"truthiness")5 2 to pass the muster of professional ethics is probably
unwise. Just because an advocate arguably could frame the Texas law
on consent in false imprisonment this way certainly does not mean
that he or she ought to.
After all, the convent's attorney will be researching and using
these cases as well. Opposing counsel might very well rely on Fojtik as
a remarkably similar and favorably-resolved case. In both scenarios a
person voluntary enters an institution for therapeutic purposes, but at
some point becomes disenchanted with the program. The defense at-
torney could very well contend that the voluntary nature of both pro-
grams controls the outcome:
When a troubled person chooses to enter a residential therapeutic
program it may be common for the patient to resist at some point,
or even ask to leave, but this is not tantamount to revoking consent
for treatment. Withdrawal of consent in such a setting must be ex-
plicit. Fojtik v. Charter Medial Corp., 985 S.W.2d 625, 631 (Tex.
App. 1999)."5
that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modifica-
tion or reversal of existing law. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R 3.1 (2002); available
at http://www.abanet.org /cpr /mrpc /rule_3_l.html). Accordingly, lawyers are limited
by the objective criteria that their arguments must not be "frivolous," but apart from
patently unwarranted claims, the vagaries of subjective interpretation, coupled with
the mutable boundaries of the "good faith" argument for the expansion of legal doc-
trine, open the door to the possibility that it might be ethical for some attorneys to
advance certain arguments that would be unequivocally unethical if made by others
(depending upon their "good faith" beliefs). But that fact would implicate the second
question that I propose. Citations so far testing the limits of credible interpretation of
existing doctrine, even if technically ethical, should likely be foregone as strategically
unwise.
52. That is, have the quality of seeming to be truthful. "Truthiness," a word con-
cocted satirically for the inaugural episode of Comedy Central's The Colbert Report, is
now defined by Merriam-Webster's dictionary as "truth that comes from the gut, not
from books." MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE (2006), http://www.m-
w.com/info/06words.htm (citing Stephen Colbert).
53. The discussion specifically referenced here holds that: "The facts of this case
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This seems effective because it uses the authority in an affirmative
way: defining a rule for a very narrow situation, and offering precise
authority on point. Moreover, counsel has implicitly dealt with Saldi-
var. The case does not need to be raised or distinguished in counter-
argument since it has been cordoned off as irrelevant.
Note that using the [no signal] signal here indicates that the au-
thority to follow "directly states the proposition." '' That is a question-
able usage here: there is little doubt that the case can be understood to
stand for this proposition, but does it actually state it? There are grey
areas subject to the interpretation of the individual litigator. The more
cautious writer might understand the rules as requiring a near paraph-
rase for the [no signal], and thus, would adopt the weaker signal. But
an advocate more comfortable with framing authority assertively
might opt for the direct citation here because it is not clearly wrong
and appears more forceful and effective than the same citation mod-
ified by "see."
The more aggressive litigator might consider resolving the con-
flict by using "see, e.g.,." That move would include careful modifica-
tion and focus attention more squarely on the implication that the re-
ferenced case is but one of many similar decisions. As long as there is
at least one other case that arguably relies upon similar reasoning,
such usage is probably legitimate. But would it be wise?
Regardless of the signal chosen here, characterizing Fojtik as de-
manding explicit withdrawal of consent for a previously-compliant
plaintiff to put forward a false imprisonment charge, counsel for the
defense has not only satisfied question one, but might well have met
the second criterion, strategic effectiveness. Nevertheless, the defense
attorney should at least consider that Sister Helen's urging Ms. Walk-
do not raise a fact issue on whether Fojtik had a 'just fear' of injury. The record before
us indicates that, while Fojtik certainly complained about being at Charter, he never
insisted that he be permitted to leave." Fojtik v. Charter Med. Corp., 985 S.W.2d 625,
631 (Tex. App. 1999). The pinpoint citation, or "jump cite," might help the reader find
that specific quotation. But even if it does not, it ought to be included by a careful
writer because it adds both technical compliance with The Bluebook's Rules 3.2 and
B5.1.2 and the appearance of precision. THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF
CITATION R. 3.2, at 59, R. B5.1.2, at 7 (Columbia Law Review Ass'n et al. eds., 18th
ed. 2005). As a side note, in drafting the text above, I considered using the quotation
in a parenthetical to the citation but decided that it was sufficiently powerful that it
would probably be better discussed, possibly quoted, in subsequent text. Legal draft-
ing is rife with such minute strategic considerations. Helping students unpack them in
assigned texts, or better yet, make them themselves, can be a lot of fun.
54. THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION R. 1.2(a) at 46 (Columbia
Law Review Ass'n et al. eds., 18th ed. 2005).
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er to remain in the room is hardly the same as Mr. Fojtik's being is-
sued passes to leave the hospital." And the powerful sense that a
young woman undergoing "religious conversion" may have regarding
a nun's authority might easily hearken back to the vulnerability of the
plaintiff in Saldivar.16 Additionally, Mary Elizabeth's sensation that
she could not simply open the door and leave might differentiate her
case from Fojtik's, and the individual characteristics raised in both
opinions could also play to her favor, since gender is clearly an issue
for both courts.
A thoughtful response to the defense articulated above might
read:
Fojtik is not, as defense counsel claims,57 solely concerned with
vocal recanting of consent. Indeed, the case turns instead on the
concrete fact that plaintiff Fojtik several times "left [Charter] and
voluntarily returned. 58 Fojtik v. Charter Medial Corp., 985 S.W.2d
625, 631 (Tex. App. 1999) (citing Randall's Food Markets, Inc. v.
Johnson, 891 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. 1995), in which the same actions by
the plaintiff "were held to negate her false imprisonment theory.")
In fact, Ms. Walker's case is far more analogous to H.E. Butt Gro-
cery Co. v. Saldivar, in which the Texas Court of Appeals held that
a young woman's failure to insist on leaving a premises could not
be deemed consent sufficient to bar her recovery for false impri-
sonment, because she might have felt "so overawed and intimi-
55. Fojtik, 985 S.W.2d at 631.
56. This is particularly true if Ms. Walker is Catholic, something suggested but
not settled in the fact pattern as given. Though of course this is a factor not mentioned
in the rather demographic description of vulnerability factors laid out in Saldivar, so
the question of how precisely the case can be used to support the notion that plain-
tiffs obedience to threatening authority can be deemed coercion rather than consent
remains an interesting one.
57. Of course, reasonable minds might differ on the advisability of attacking op-
posing counsel's assertions so directly, rather than doing so by inference but without
direct reference. Common wisdom usually holds that while it is wise to concede an
opponent's points that are beyond refute, advocates should, otherwise, stick solely to
elaborating their own arguments without explicit reference to opposing parties' posi-
tions. In this example, though, I am imagining an attorney who has decided that her
primary strategy revolves around categorizing Fojtik as irrelevant and encouraging the
court to disregard it. Thus, the effect of calling attention to the defendant's reliance
upon the case is to suggest, implicitly, that if the court agrees with the plaintiff's inter-
pretation of that case, then it will have to similarly agree that the defense's case must
inevitably fall like a house of cards once its foundational reliance on Fojtik is revealed
to be faulty.
58. Note that in order to make this point, this quotation is not necessarily needed,
but its inclusion helps call for the parenthetical reference to Johnson, which streng-
thens the entire passage.
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dated" that she could not meaningfully refuse the entreaties of a
person with a great deal of perceived power. 752 S.W.2d 701, 703
(Tex. App. 1988) (citing Black v. Kroger, 527 S.W.2d 794, 800 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1975)).
The well-conceived reply could in turn contend quite simply that:
Fojtik, like the plaintiff here, was a voluntary patient whose claims
to have been imprisoned were dismissed because "he never insisted
that he be permitted to leave." Fojtik, 985 S.W.2d at 631. Absent
physical restraint (e.g. Skillern & Sons, Inc. v. Stewart, 379 S.W.2d
687 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964) (cited in Fojtik at 630)), or unusual
weakness or susceptibility (e.g., Black v. Kroger, 527 S.W.2d 794
(Tex. App. 1975) (cited in Fojtik at 630-31)), there can be no jury
question as to whether the plaintiff had a "just fear" or injury. Foj-
tik, 985 S.W.2d at 631-32.
All of the examples developed above show two sides speaking to
each other, one posing the problem in one way and the other respond-
ing. As this conversation developed in complexity, so did the process
of citation, building towards increasingly sophisticated ways of under-
standing and using the source material. Not coincidentally, as the
analysis progresses it also comes closer to crafting examples that can
more fully satisfy the two criteria set up at the beginning of this discus-
sion, balancing the "can" with the "should."
Because the practice of law always leaves room for strategy and
interpretation, no two lawyers are going to have the same approach to
this case. But most lawyers could see, understand, and agree with this
construction as effective, even if it were not the path they themselves
would choose.
C. Teaching Legal Authority in Action.
If we turn from imagining this as an actual case to presenting it,
instead as hypothetical law students might face, what does the discus-
sion above do for them?
Let us suppose that both cases had been included in a torts class
on false imprisonment, and the student finds this fact pattern on an
exam. The student's immediate reaction is to list the three elements
of false imprisonment and one would hope, soon realize that the case
turns on the question of consent. Ideally, the student would duplicate
the thinking of our hypothetical lawyers above, working through both
sides of the argument, replicating what the lawyer would do interpre-
tively with both the facts and the relevant cases.
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Replicating those thinking processes is an important part of help-
ing students understand one of the most basic yet most elusive con-
cepts in the study of law: the idea that rules of law can be both fixed
(and binding), and simultaneously somewhat malleable as they are
applied to new facts and interpreted in new cases. After grappling with
Saldivar and Fojtik in these various iterations, what student would not
understand the boundaries and definitions of false imprisonment more
fully? Negotiating not just the cases but also, how one might use the
cases as authority-the "can" and the "should"-teaches students the
limits (and the elasticity of the limits) of doctrine because they are
required to test their rhetoric against the standards of both ethical and
credible argumentation. Moreover, students also comprehend more
deeply how legal authority functions in the arena of advocacy and how
cases can be manipulated (although always within limits) to serve var-
ious arguments. Working through citations helps make the uses of law,
the basis of common law itself, more concrete.
Teaching students the significance of citation might also have the
added bonus of helping them learn to execute the formal elements of
bluebooking more successfully because what they are doing feels that
much more important and comprehensible.
D. Teaching Citations in Context
Of course, what most people mean when they say "bluebooking,"
the purely technical process of using proper citation form, the majority
of students do not do very well. One part of the solution to improve
competence in basic citation form can be to embed it within a broader
investigation into using authority effectively. This would help trans-
form a meaningless set of letters and numbers into a rubric that makes
sense. 9 Although that does not guarantee that students will correctly
59. Of course, I do realize that in talking about how we cover the building blocks
of legal citation, I have moved to material that would, in most institutions, be covered
somewhere other than the torts class I was imagining just above. The material that I
am describing here would most likely be taught in some version of a legal re-
search/writing/analysis course. Such a transition is not inconsequential, although my
invisible switching among educational forums may suggest that it is. In fact, weaving
together the various concepts introduced in different segments of law school curricu-
lum is an enormous task for students, and it is something in which all law schools
would probably like to improve their own efforts.
Nonetheless, this task of this article is imagination. It is important to be aware
of the boundaries in what we teach but not always to be limited by them. We may not
easily be able to accomplish everything I discuss here; we may not even want to. But
simply considering it and finding ways to use the critical teaching of legal authority to
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follow every single rule devised in their citation handbook, it can help
ensure that they will master basic citation form. After all, research on
learning clearly suggests that the better students understand a concept,
the more easily and effectively they retain it, use it, and deploy it cor-
rectly.
Imagine, for example, that rather than teaching citation form in a
top-down way that impresses upon students any number of rules, we
approached it from the ground up. What if we asked students to con-
struct, based on what they know about how law operates, the pieces of
information someone might need in order to evaluate the legal sup-
port offered for a given proposition? Suppose the authority in ques-
tion was a case decided by a court. How could we identify it so that
judges, other lawyers, and law students could track down the source
and verify the accuracy of our arguments? Most likely, students, given
a minute to consider the question, would conclude that they needed to
know:
1. What is the name of the case;
2. How to find it: where in the reporters it is assembled and arc-
hived;
3. When it was decided and its contemporary relevance;
4. Which court decided it, the level of its authoritativeness, and its
jurisdiction;
5. Whether it is still good law. Have any subsequent cases re-
thought, rewritten, or substantially changed its holdings?
6. The precise meaning of the decision;
7. Where in the text of the decision that central meaning can be
found, by page number; and
8. Why this case is being introduced in this time and place: that is,
how it relates to the assertion for which it is being raised.
60
Not surprisingly, this list of necessary information covers every
single point in the standard case citation format. Indeed, The Blu-
enrich our curriculum, can be enough.
60. I should acknowledge that some years back I did, in fact, ask these questions
to large sections of the entire entering class at NYU School of Law. Without excep-
tion (but occasionally with a bit of faculty prodding), each group generated slightly
differently-worded versions of precise!y this list.
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ebook itself used to make this clear to its readers; in earlier editions
there was a section called "Typical Legal Citations Analyzed" that
diagramed the elements of a standard citation, all of which are in-
cluded on the above list.' Even in the absence of that feature, the
Bluepages section of the current edition presents itself as providing
"easy-to-comprehend guidance for the everyday citation needs of first-
year law students, summer associates, law clerks, practicing lawyers,
and other legal professionals."62 A glance at the chapter subheadings
in the Bluepages simultaneously bears out and belies this claim, de-
pending upon the attitude of the reader: B3 "Elements of a Citation";
B4 "Introductory Signals"; B5.1.1 "Case Names"; B5.1.2 "Reporter
and Pinpoint Citation"; B5.1.3 "Court and Year of Decision"; B5.1.5
"Subsequent History"; and so on.63
Collectively, these elements (numerically-coded!) can make a
student's head spin. But if we start by treating them not as random
blobs of information but instead as containing everything you need,
then the conventions of basic citation form become a fairly simple,
almost elegant way of presenting this information in readily-available,
comprehensible form. Understanding the process and purpose of legal
citation necessarily makes it easier to learn and to do, both concep-
tually and technically.
IV. ADOPTING A "CRITICAL AUTHORITIES" CURRICULUM
What if legal educators collectively decided that teaching students
to understand the nuances of legal authority, and to cite it correctly
and thoughtfully, was central to the mission of legal education in a
common law system? Even assuming that we could reach such a con-
sensus in a world of many, many competing interests and constantly
limited pools of resources, it would be hard to know where to start.
The first difficulty in imagining how to integrate this kind of cur-
riculum into a law school is deciding where it fits. Currently, many law
students and beginning lawyers come away from their legal education
thinking that "citation work" is really or only about mastering the in-
tricacies of 415 pages of rules and cross-referencing in the eighteenth
edition of The Bluebook.6' Moreover, professors generally assign the
61. THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION (Columbia Law Review Ass'n et
al. eds. 17th ed. 2000).
62. THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION Introduction, at 1 (Columbia Law
Review Ass'n et al. eds. 18th ed. 2005).
63. Id. B3, B4, at 4, B5.1.1, at 6, B5.1.2, at 7, B1.5.3, at 8, B5.1.5, at 10.
64. Or the 572 pages and 49 general rules of the 3rd edition of the ALWD Cita-
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teaching of technical bluebooking to legal writing courses, substantive
comprehension of law to required doctrinal classes, and studying the
ways that students absorb learning about legal process to academic
support programs. Whether this division of labor is doing anyone any
good is, and has been, a matter of debate, but within the usual current
structure there is no easy place where the integrated understanding of
legal authorities that this article proposes neatly fits.
Although, institutionally, this presents a pragmatic obstacle to es-
tablishing this kind of program, the comprehensive nature of a critical
legal authorities curriculum also offers a kind of challenge to the pe-
dagogical status quo and enables a kind of flexibility of ownership of
these ideas. No matter where we sit in the law school, all of us can, at
least in some small way, decide that it is part of our jobs to teach legal
authority well. We do not necessarily need a comprehensive curricular
change to incrementally become more explicit about the complex
ways that legal authority can be understood, characterized, and cited.
Regardless of our individual institutional roles, all of us are engaged in
the project of getting students to understand and use law; a critical
examination of the uses of legal authority and citation can fit into any
class, in any field, if we want it to.
Thus, despite the structural challenges this material may pose,
there may be good news. For example, a classic torts textbook might
include a case like Saldivar to introduce and illustrate the richness of
notions of consent when there is an implication of coercion or threat.
It might also (although this is becoming rarer) include Foltik as a
counterpoint so that students could be invited to consider the bounda-
ries of the sympathy for the plaintiff that is evidenced in Saldivar. Ra-
ther than simply reading the cases to discuss their contradictions or
reconciliation in class, students could be asked to work through ways
of citing and using the cases in a scenario like that of Mary Elizabeth
Walker's, so that they might build for themselves a more sophisticated
grasp of the material. Similar examples might be constructed by draw-
ing on materials in criminal law, evidence, wills, and so forth.
In addition, legal writing programs, rather than treating citation
as drudgery to be gotten through, can introduce strategic citation and
framing of legal authority with greater enthusiasm as a crucial part of
the thinking and writing process.
Academic support professionals, whose work often focuses on
finding a point of entry for students to learn the law with a basic grasp
of what it is as both a field and a phenomenon, might work with mate-
tion Manual.
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rials students are studying by playing "citation games" to introduce
students to the intellectual excitement of relating cases and facts to
one another.
In other words, these kinds of approaches do not require a com-
plete re-imagining of what we teach and how we teach it. What they
would require, however, is a shift in perspective. We would need to
cover the same set of materials but start from a different place. A crit-
ical legal authorities approach is focused on making connections be-
tween the analytical, the rhetorical, and the formulaic: indeed, on
showing that these elements of legal education are not really separate
at all, but intertwined. To do this, we must also begin to dissolve the
boundaries between form and content, doctrine and skills, argumenta-
tion and citation; boundaries that case law itself shows us are con-
structed rather than actual. I think it is not too much to hope that, as a
result, we will end up with students less bewildered by the challenges
they face and more enmeshed in the purpose of their education.
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